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1. Introduction 
Professor Barnard has provided a stimulating account of his views 
on inference. I share his optimism about the possibility of consensus, 
and I agree with all of his prefatorial recommendations~*)Nevertheless, 
I must stress the value of work in areas outside the orlHt of Barnard's 
discussion of the issues if a real consensus is to be achieved, My 
detailed discussion will focus on four areas which should be addressed 
in a broadly-based discussion: ancillarity, approximate.likelihood 
methods, nonparametric analysis, and simultaneous estimation. First, 
however, I should like to mention some points that need fuller discussion 
in the literature: 
(a) the sources and interpretations of probability, 
(b) the inter-action between modelling and analysis, --
(c) extensions of Jeffreys's rational Bayesian theory, and 
(d) the extent to which decision theory has provided 
useful results for inference and methodology. 
This last is important because the usual negative attitude of "inferentialists" 
toward decision theorists, and vice versa, is counterproductive and 
could preclude a genuine consensus. 
2. Ancil larity 
The concept and use of ancillarity arise in Barnard's paper, but in 
a fairly limited setting that gives a rather narrow view of this 
fundamental idea. I have recently discussed some of the issues in print 
(Hinkley, 1981), and so I shall try to be brief here. 
In statistical inference we deal with probability summaries, and 
in order that these be as meaningful as possible for the case at hand 
-- -~- ~~-=-----~ (*) see Appendix. 
these probabilities should be defined on a relevant set of possible 
sample outcomes. Such a relevant set would be the smallest set, 
surrounding the observed~outcome, on which a sufficiently rich 
probability distribution is defined. At the same time, restriction 
from the -prior set-of-possible outcomesto fhe- actua-1 -reference set 
should not lose information relevant to the inference. 
This qualitative notion is made precise in connection with 
parametric statistical models by defining an ancillary statistic, 
which indexes the relevant set of outcomes. Thus, if Sis minimal 
sufficient fore such that S = (T, A), where A1 s distribution is 
independent of a, then A is ancillary. The relevant set of sample 
outcomes is {S: A= a} when!. is:the observed value of A. There are, 
however, two kinds of ancillary statistics, namely experimental and 
mathematical (Kalbfeisch, 1975). The former, Ae, determines a series 
of performable experiments, and for pedagogical purpose experimental 
ancillaries are most effective; typical being the "choice of instruments" 
example (Efron & Hinkley, 1978, Section 1) and the regression example 
where Ae is the set of explanatory variables. Conditioning inference 
on Ae is simply equivalent to analysing the particular experiment 
actually performed. A mathematical ancillary statistic Am is more 
dffficult, because it is an abstract artefact of the particular 
stochastic model and seems to have no physically attractive interpretation. 
However, we must remember that in the interplay between modelling and 
analysis,~ provides measures of agreement between data and model, 
- -
so that conditioning on Am is equivalent to making an automatic allowance 
for pre-inference tests of fit. Classical unconditional inference 
is suspect because it fails to make such an allowance, which seems 
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surprising in view of the vast literature on goodness of fit procedures 
such as tests of normality. 
Exact ancillarity is a rather restrictive property. Recently 
the notion of approximate ancillarity has been discussed in connection 
with large sa~ple likelihood methods; see section 3 of my comments. 
The general idea is that the information content of A should be o(l), 
preferably O(N-1), as some notional quantity N (such as sample size) 
increases. This is useful either when an exact ancillary does not exist, 
or when an exact ancillary defines a singleton reference set. Of course, 
approximations should be viewed with caution, and should be tested 
numerically. But at the same time we should remember that in practice 
all of statistics deals in approximations: exactness is convenient 
for logical development, but should not be an impediment to. app-licatio-n. 
The possibility of ancillarityarises also in connexion with 
randomization and experimental design, where some would argue that the 
outcome of a randomly selected design is ancillary. Such a fallacy 
is easy to arrive at if the earlier qualitative explanation is ignored. 
A legitimate question of ancillarity arises if a design outcome 
belongs to a particular subset of designs, such as the subsets of 
diagonal and Knight's Move Latin Squares •. For further, albeit brief, 
discussion, see Hinkley (1980). A thorough treatment of ancillarity 
should include discussion of this area. 
3. Awkward Asymptotics 
I would agree that the asymptotics literature is awkward, and 
surely Barnard is right to cast a critical eye on the work of LeCam, 
Berkson and others relating to the MLE. However, I believe that much 
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progress has been made in the last ten years on approximate likelihood 
methods, and has finally led to constructive understanding of Fisher's 
work. 
There has been a basic misunderstanding between decision theorists 
and inferentialists. The former solve decision problems (in the 
abstract, with a monotonous predilection for mean squared error loss), 
and so they work beyond the inference stage. Fisher gave the basic 
ingredients of inference, with the MLE as the first step in an approximate 
sufficiency reduction. Nobody would claim that the MLE.itself would 
be the solution to a specific decision problem. A good discussion of 
----~ --~ ----- ---
this issue is contained in Efren's 1981 Walcf Lecture III. 
In the approximate inferential solution of parametric problems, 
A 
the MLE a is complemented by successive likelihood derivatives 
I= -10, t 0, etc. In effect one uses as many derivatives as would be 
needed to give an accurate reconstruction of the likelihood itself, 
so that one keeps a set of statistics which is approximately sufficient. 
Simplicity will sometimes require parameter transformation, as is well 
illustrated in work on non-linear regression by~amflton, Watts, and 
Bates (1981, 1982). Interest in approximate likelihood methods was 
kept alive by work of D. Sprott, and in recent years there have been 
major advances in approximate conditional inference by Amari, 
Barndorff-Nielsen, Cox, Efron, Hinkley, and the Skovgaards. I would 
welcome Barnard's comments on these developments. 
One of the simplest results that was first emphasised by Efron 
~ A 
and myself is that Q = 1 2 (0 - a) is-approximately pivotal and 
approximately N(O, ll independent of approximate ancillaries. At 
the time we worked with i.i.d. variables, but there is evidence now 
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that Q is approximately pivotal in great generality. As an illustration 
1 take an example mentioned to me by D. Siegmund. Let {X(s): O < s s.n} 
be the continuous analog of an first-order autogressive process (ARl), 
defined by 
dX(s) = 0X(s)ds + dZ(s), {Z( • D Gaussian white noise. 
This process is non-stationary, and the usual unconditional asymptotic 
. •• ~ A 
result, i.e. {E(-t0)}l0 - 8) ~ N(O, 1) as n inceases, fails-as it does 
in the ARl process with regression coefficient 0 +.1 outside (-1, 1). 
But the pivot Q is exactly N(O, l}. This is proved by showing that 
8 - 0 -- l~ .X(s)dZ(s)/1~ x2(s)ds 
is exactly N(O, i-1) conditional on I= f~ x2{s)ds. 
A more useful statement of asymptotic normality would seem to be: 
!-:: A •• 
1 2 (0 - 0) ~ N(O, 1), with I/E(-t0) ~ 1 -in ergodic problems. If both 
results hold, then we have the standard textbook result 
{E(-i6)}½(8 - 0) ~ N(O, 1). 
or course when the likelihood is not itself approximately normal 
in shape, then the approximate inference solution 1½(8 - 8) ~ N(O, 1) 
is not adequate. More refined approximations are discussed by 
Bandorff-Nielsen, Cox, Hinkley, and Sprott in recent work. 
4. Modelling, Sampling and Nonparametric Analysis 
Barnard correctly argues that serious efforts should be made to 
create catalogs of information about models from data. There is no 
substitute for a correct model. Note, however, that continued monitoring 
of data will often give information about distributions of parameters. 
This would suggest that when models are based on sequential experience 
with similar data sets, (empirical) Bayesian inference will be appropriate. 
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One area where models do not seem to play much of a role is simple 
survey analysis. In fact there is a gulf between sampling methods and 
parametric model analysis in most expositions, perhaps because the~ . 
familiar exactness of theory in the parametric context is not available 
for finite population sampling. 
Does pivotal ·1 inference have a role in sample survey analysis? 
Suppose that we are interested in a population mean, and sample n = 20 
items from a population of 1000. If we know nothing about the population, 
should we base our inference on (X - µ)/s, or on X/µ? Whichever we choose, 
how should we use it knowing that normal approximations are often 
inadequate? -n,ereare-few answers to oe found about tnis very basfc--~- -
problem in the literature. One useful approach suggested by Efron (1981) 
is to estimate the distribution of a chosen "pivot,'~ such as (X - µ)/s, 
by simulation with samples drawn with replacement from a population 
whose frequency distribution is uniform on the observed data values. 
This simple idea is often effective. 
The situation is even more difficult if we wish to compare two 
finite population means. The following unusual suggestion is based 
on an idea of Efron's. Suppose we have two independent samples 
x1, •.. , xn and y1, ••• , Yn and that we wish to compare the two population 
means mx and my. Further, take the extreme position of not assuming 
that values other than those observed are possible. Then our populations 
are modelled as follows 
possible values 
frequences 
Population 1 
xl, •.. , xn 
fl' ••. , fn 
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Population 2 
Yp•••, Yn 
91, ..• , 9n 
A -1 A -1 
The MLE's of fi and gi are fi = n , gj = n • The null hypothesis 
of equal means, mx = my, forces the constraint Exifi = Eyjgj. Suppose 
that we wish to assess the signicance of an observed positive difference 
x - y. Following the traditional conservativeipproach, we calculate 
significance probability under the specific null model which makes the 
data as plausible as possible-interpreted here to mean the specific 
A A 
frequency vectors f and~ which minimize Efjlog(fj/fj) + Egilog(gi/gi). 
---- --- --- ~- - -~-------~~ ----------
This gives the simple null model fj aexp(A01xj),gi a exp(-A0ly1) 
with AO satisfying EA
0
(X - V) == O. In the-,family parametrized by A, 
A 
the unconstrained MLE corresponds to A= O. The required significance 
probability 
P = probA0(x - V ~ x - y) 
can be expresses as 
P = !_g_xp(nA0s) probi(X - V = s), 
s=x-y 
" 
where of course A= O. Thus the significance probability can be estimated 
by simulation under A = 0, i.e. ··.using repeated samples drawn with replace-
ment from the original data. 
This proposed procedure is extreme, in the sense that absolutely 
no modelling is involved. In the general context of Boostrap methods, 
it is but one of many possible procedures. I would be interested to 
know Barnard's thoughts on this kind of problem, and in particular 
his thoughts on the relevance of pivotal inference. 
5. Simultaneous Estimation 
There is a brief mention of this topic in Barnard's paper, where 
he suggests that shrinkage estimates are unethical. I think this 
comment was ill-advised and based on some misconceptions about 
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simultaneous estimation methods. Perhaps this is because much of the 
post-Stein work was pretty sterile decision theory, and more recently 
Stein's ideas have been perverted in the naive work on ridge regression. 
I would bet very heavily that if any consensus is reached in statistics, 
then the consequences of Stein's work will have a prominent place. We 
should try to understand in a qualitative sense what Stein's mathematical 
results are about-this kind of understanding led to important practical 
work by Efron and Morris, in an empi·rical Bayes mould. Roughly speaking, 
if the data strongly suggest a distribution for parameters, then we have 
a situation where Bayesian pivotal inference applies: in the simple 
case of estimating means µ1• = x. + s.e. andµ.= m + t.f. where 1 1 1 1 1 1 
si and ti are scale statistics, mis an overall mean, and ei, fi are 
independent with known pivotal distributions, why would it~be unethical 
to use all of the information? Not to do so in Barnard's census 
application might lead to rewards for sloppy surveys which give some 
unbiased estimates the advantage of extreme sampling errors. 
Of~course one should pay attention to questions of robustness, 
and attempt proper modelling of the application liinlike what happens 
in ridge regression). More recent work by Stein has done this; see 
Stein (1981). 
Perhaps the language of decision theory is at fault in our 
under-appreciation of the work on simultaneous estimation. This is 
why I think that we should seriously assess the practical implications 
of decision theory-it is not useless, but may seem to be simply because 
it is in a language foreign to many of us. 
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APPENDIX 
Preface to "A Coherent View of Statistical Inference" 
The following pages present arguments in favour of a number of 
changes in statistical practice. Other arguments can be made leading 
to similar recommendations. It is more important for us statisticians 
to agree on our practical recommendations than on the reasons underlying 
these. I therefore have listed the principal recommendations here, 
particularly to invite your judgement, of support or of opposition: 
(i} We should discourage statements of the form 'P < .05' in relation 
to testing hypotheses. There can be little excuse, if any, nowadays, 
for omitting to specify P = so and so. It can then be for the reader 
to choose his level of significance, if .he wants one. 
(ii} The P value should be conditional on the occurrence of any aspect 
of the data whose probability would not be changed by abandoning the 
hypothesis H
0 
tested. 
(iii} In addition to quoting the P value, whenever it is possible to 
formulate a reasonably plausible alternative to H0 , the likelihood ratio 
should be quoted in addition to the P value. If there is a family 
H(a} of alternatives, a suitably weighted compound of H(e) may be used 
for this purpose, or alternatively the likelihood function can be plotted. 
The P value and the likelihood ratio are each measures of strength of 
evidence, neither being superior to the other, in general. 
(iv) We should abandon the notion of estimation as attempting to find 
a single number 'closest', in some sense, to the true parameter value. 
The object of estimation is to make an estimation statement, one of the 
simplest fonns of which would be 
e = t(x) + s(-e) ( e density lJ,( e)) 
which is to be interpreted as meaning that (t-0)/s has the distribution 
specified by:lthe density 1/J. This last should be in some standard, agreed 
form, for instance having mode or median at O and a unit semi-interquartile 
range. More generally, the estimation statement may have to take the 
form 
f(x,e) has density 1JJ 
where, for given x, the mapping f(x,e) is 1-1. Whether such statements 
are possible may depend on the particular data to hand. 
(v) Because the conditional argument allows us to treat, without undue 
difficulty, arbitrary observations densities, we should cease trying to 
fit data analyses to the Procrustean bed of normality of distribution, 
and instead gather empirical data on distributional forms and use these 
in our analyses. 
(vi) We should recognize that 'robustness' of inference is a conditional 
property--some inferences from some samples are robust, in the sense 
that changing assumptions about distributional form matters little. 
But other inferences, or the same inferences from other samples, may 
depend strongly on the distributional assumptions. In the latter 
case it is the statistician's job to point to the dependence on 
distributional form, not to obscure this fact. This is part of the 
general duty to tell clients not only what they may take as known, 
but also what they should take as unknown, in so far as it may be 
relevant to the matters they are concerned with. 
(vii) We should recognize that probability is a complex concept, in its 
application to data, and that it is too much to hope that all questions 
can be answered in terms of P values, likelihood ratios, or estimation 
statements of a simple kind. More complex forms of final inference, 
for example such as that illustrated in the text in connection with 
the Behrens-Fisher probolem, may be needed. We have put ourselves in 
shackles by attempting to keep things over-simple; it is time we broke 
out. 
(viii) The Bayesian controversy is irrelevant to statistical inference. 
Since the method of analysis is the same, whether or not prior distri-
butions are or are not admitted, the question becomes whether or not a 
given assumption is justifiable in each given case. 
